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. Introduction
Extensive literature on the legacy of the Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions exists. Scholars have chronicled and assessed in considerable
detail how a set of landmark decisions fared both in the Court's subsequent
thirty-plus years of case law and in terms of achieving practical success in
everyday criminal practice. Instead of attempting to supplement this vast and
well-executed effort, I want to draw on the approaches of intellectual and
social history to offer a broad thesis concerning the impact of Warren Court
* Associate Professor and Alumni Faculty Fellow, Washington and Lee University
School of Law.
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criminal procedure decisions on the dramatic transformation of the larger
criminal justice system in the three decades since Earl Warren's resignation.
I would like to suggest an understanding of how the Warren Court's legacy
contributed to the current problematic state of our criminal justice system
through an argument about how the Court's decisions contributed to larger
social debates and political policy choices. My thesis, in short, is that Warren
Court criminal procedure decisions - which largely (but not entirely) embodied a theme of strengthening individual rights and entitlements for the criminally accused - indirectly and perversely contributed to the harsh punitivism
that characterizes criminal justice today. If that is true, it contributes to a
broader thesis about the limited ability of courts to lead large-scale social
change, and it also suggests how little courts should worry about the long-term
effects of their decisions.
H. Current Scholarshipon Courts and Social Reform
Let me situate this story about the effects of the Warren Court's decisions
on the criminal justice system in the context of existing scholarship on criminal procedure and, to a lesser extent, on scholarship that assesses the ability
of courts to effectuate substantial social change. One of my building blocks
is Bill Stuntz's work on the interaction of criminal procedure and substantive
criminal law.2 Stuntz has argued that improving criminaljustice- key components of which are fair treatment of suspects and effective checks on abuse of
police power - is difficult to achieve by a judicial focus on criminal procedure.3 Yet procedure, of course, was the focus of Warren Court jurisprudence
on criminal justice.4 The Court's contributions to constitutional regulation of
substantive criminal law are notably sparse and weak.5
1. For obvious countervailing decisions, see, for example, Schmerber v. California,384
U.S. 757, 765 (1966), in which the Court stated that a blood test taken without the defendant's
consent does not violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination; Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202, 221 (1965), which decided that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit
exercising peremptory challenges against jurors on the basis of race; and, most importantly,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), in which the Court determined that courts cannot invoke
the exclusionary rule for products of legitimate and restrained investigational techniques.
2. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
CriminalJustice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997).
3. See id. at 4 (remarking that judges who make decisions about criminal procedure rules
have no real information about crime rates and funding decisions).
4. See id. at 72 (concluding that in recent decades constitutional law has focused heavily
on criminal procedure, but not on substantive criminal law).
5. See id. at 68-69 (detailing Court's attempts to regulate substantive criminal law and
concluding that "substantive regulation has shrunk" while procedural regulation has grown).
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Other branches of government have in their control two powerful tools
with which to respond to criminal procedure decisions. One is enforcement
power, which crucially includes funding, but also includes day-to-day discipline, which makes procedural safeguards more or less meaningful.' So, for
instance, while Gideon v. Wainwright' guarantees counsel to every defendant
accused of a jailable offense,8 virtually no judicial regulation of how counsel
are paid takes place.9 States can woefully underfund appointed counsel and
substantially undercut the meaningfulness of Gideon."0 Or, funding issues
aside, police departments still have considerable discretion in their regulation
of the meaningful constraints found in Mapp v. Ohio" and Miranda v. Arizona,1 2 regulating unwarranted or pretextual searches 3 and incriminating
statements 4 respectively.
The second tool that the executive and legislative branches have to
undercut criminal procedure is the power to define substantive criminal law.'
These branches can easily circumvent constitutional limitations on broad,
vague criminal statutes' 6 by enacting numerous specific statutes, such as
traffic codes including every conceivable traffic offense. The more conduct
that the government criminalizes, the more frequently citizens commit crimes,
and the more readily police have probable cause to stop and search citizens. 7
6. See id. at 6-12 (detailing legislatures' ability to influence criminal procedure by
funding, or not funding, various components of criminal justice system and thus concluding that
states "can, to some degree, trump the trump" of constitutional criminal procedure).
7. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,342 (1963) (finding that Sixth Amendment
right to counsel is fundamental right obligatory upon states through Fourteenth Amendment).

9.

See Stuntz, supra note 2, at 70 (arguing that use of substantive regulation governing

compensation and performance of court-appointed counsel would make system "substantially
fairer" and that failure of constitutional law to so mandate may undercut Gideon).
10. See id. (stating that "[ajbsent sufficient resources, counsel cannot act as counsel" and
that Gideon thus should require "some budgetary floors").
11.
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
12. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
13. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 645-46 (1961) (extending exclusionary rule to
states).
14. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,439 (1966) (requiring warning upon custodial
interrogation).
15. See Stuntz, supra note 2, at 50 (noting that definition of crimes and fixing of sentences is left to legislatures); see also Richard A. Posner, The Most Punitive Nation, TIMES
LrrERARY SUPPLEMENT, Sept. 1, 1995, at 3 (arguing that legislatures have responded to
increased constitutional rights for criminals by making punishments more severe).
16. See, e.g., Papachristov v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972) (overturning
vagrancy statute because it prevented even-handed administration ofjustice).
17. See Markus Dirk Dubber, PolicingPossession: The War on Crime and the End of
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If this is true, then we have reason to doubt that the Warren Court's efforts to
improve criminal justice through criminal procedure protections yielded a
system as substantially improved as the Court and its supporters initially
hoped. Taking this view, criminal procedure rules may not fully achieve
specific goals (such as reducing illegal searches, coerced convictions, or
uncounseled felony convictions) because legislatures can expand criminal law
(by giving police more options for legal stops and searches) and underfund
courts and public defense (creating systemic pressures that make appointed
counsel a formal but ineffective reality).
Another body of scholarship has cast skepticism on the ability of courts
to achieve widespread social reform without substantial support from the
political branches and the public. Gerald Rosenberg's view of "constrained
courts" is a leading work in this vein."' Rosenberg has argued that courts are
relatively ineffectual institutions for social reform in large part because they
depend on other branches of government to implement their decisions, but
also because of other factors, such as the limited nature of constitutional
rights. 9 Courts are effective at facilitating significant social change,
Rosenberg argues, only when they have implicit support in at least one other
branch of government and, if not popular support, at least minimal popular
resistance.2"
Along with this argument, also keep in mind a related thesis: Mark
Tushnet's case for populist constitutional law and minimal judicial review.2"
Tushnet has argued that court-based systemic reform can have the unproductive effect of disengaging political activism directed at achieving reform
through legislative and other political channels rather than through judicial
decision.2 Others who support the same notion note that elected officials, and
CriminalLaw,91 J.CRIM.L. & CRIMINOLOY 829, 856-59 (2001) (discussing how possession
offenses provide police with tremendous authority o search, arrest, and incarcerate); see also
William J. Stuntz,ImplicitBargains,GovernmentPower,and the FourthAmendment, 44 STAN.
L. REv. 553, 561 (1992) ("[O]vercriminalization is an easy way to get around Fourth Amendment restrictions."); Stuntz, supranote 2, at 7, 54 (arguing overcriminalization).
18. See generally GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HoLLow HOPE (1991) (discussing role of
courts in creating political and social change in twentieth century).
19. See id. at 9-21 (discussing proposition that courts generally cannot produce significant
social reform because of limitations on constitutional rights, lack of judicial independence,
judicial inability to develop appropriate policies, and lack of power over implementation).
20. See id. at 30-36 (stating that "[w]hen political, social and economic conditions
support change, courts can effectively implement social change").
21. SeegenerallyMARKTUSHNET, TAKINGTHE CONSTITLI~rONAWAYFROMTHE COURTS
(2001) (arguing that public should participate more directly in shaping constitutional law and
"reclaim" Constitution from courts).
22. See id. at 173-74, 185-90 (discussing connections among politics, abolishing judicial
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not the courts, were responsible for key advances in human rights, such as the
abolition of slavery in America and the decriminalization of homosexuality
in Britain.23 Arguably, popular debate would focus more on substantive
problems at issue rather than on the legitimacy of social reform imposed by
judicial rulemaking. Consider, for example, how Roe v. Wade24 transformed
the abortion debate into one centrally concerned with the exercise of judicial
power.
These differing views of the ability of courts to achieve systemic reform
relatively independent of political and social efforts to achieve the same goal
suggest that bold rulemaking by courts is often ineffectual. Moreover, in
some cases, bold doctrinal choices aimed at social reform arguably can be
counterproductive. Perhaps one example outside of the field of criminal
procedure is Brown v. Board of Education,25 which struck down racial segregation in state public schools.26 Brown attempted to dictate a change in social
practices even more dramatic than Miranda,27 which, unlike other Warren
Court decisions, had no widespread predecessor in state law or practice.2
Michael Klarman has argued that Brown did little to achieve racial integration
in schools; ten years after the decision the portion of children attending
integrated schools had barely increased.29 It was only after legislative action the 1964 Civil Rights Act - that real progress began.3" Klarman suggests that
what impact Brown did have was indirect and perverse.31 Brown's impact was
perverse because it galvanized conservative, white opposition to integration
in the South. The vehemence and violence of that opposition helped galvanize
review, and "populist constitutional law").
23. See Jeremy Waldron, A Question ofJudgment, TIMEs LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Sept.
28,2001,at 7 (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, TAKIN THE CONSTmIrIONAWAYFROMTHE COURTS
(2001)) (questioning widely-held belief that electoral politics disenfranchises minorities).

24.
25.

410U.S.113 (1973).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).

26. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (stating that doctrine of
"separate but equal" does not belong in public schools).
27. See Miranda v.Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,478-79 (1966) (holding that police must warn
accused party of rights before proceeding with custodial interrogation).
28. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITCS 394 (2000)
(noting that Mirandarequired all states to change their criminal procedure law and practice).
29. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80
VA. L. REV. 7, 9 (1994) ("Brown was directly responsible for only the most token forms of
southern public school desegregation.").
30. See id. at 10 (observing that integration rate in South rose significantly after 1964
Civil Rights Act threatened to cut federal funding for southern school districts).
31. See id. (noting that forces for racial change would have eventually undermined Jim
Crow even without Brown).
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a growing civil rights movement and popular national support for civil rights
reform. 2 Thus, Brown helped contribute to integration largely by energizing
segregationists and thereby forcing the issue onto the nation's political
agenda.
An analysis roughly similar to the first-half of Klarman's story about
Brown - the emergence of opposition - helps explain the effect of the Warren
Court's criminal procedure legacy on criminal justice. The second-haifof the
story - the perverse effect of achieving ultimate success through a galvanized
political debate - fits less well for these criminal procedure decisions. The
Warren Court decisions - Miranda foremost - prompted widespread opposition that took the form of political debate and reform efforts. 3 But legislative
action in the ensuing years was hardly in a direction that ultimately served the
ends pursued by the Court; Congress famously attempted to overturn Miranda
in particular." On the other hand, a range of Warren Court decisions had at
least more formal success than Brown. In the wake of Gideon, felons have
widespread access to at least minimal assistance of counsel; the question is
how meaningful this minimal help is. There is also wide acceptance of
Miranda as a police practice; the question is whether it has much practical
effect on informing suspects' decisions to talk to police (and on police efforts
to undercut its practical effect).
III CriminalProcedurein Social Context
Thus, the criminal procedure cases did not follow the same path that
Klarman describes in the second-halfof his Brown analysis. Brown's goal of
integration was achieved, to the very partial extent that it was, largely through
political activism resulting in civil rights legislation and its subsequent implementation. Brown's goal of desegregation coincided with social forces pushing
for that same goal. Klarman argues that the latter deserves more credit than the
former for much of the integration we achieved.35

32. See id. at 11 (remarking that crucial link between Brown and 1960s civil rights
movement was that Brown crystallized southern resistance).
33. See Stuntz, supra note 2, at 53 (stating that "only legislative response" to Miranda
"was a congressional effort to overrule it").
34. See United States v. Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (striking down 18 U.S.C
§ 3501 (2000), which made admissibility of defendant's statements turn solely on whether
statements were voluntary and declaring that Congress cannot overrule Miranda).
35. See Klarman, supra note 29, at 77-85 (discussing conventional view of Brown's
impact on civil rights movement and outlining alternative causal chain between Brown and civil
rights legislation).
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Contrast the movement toward integration with the evolution of criminal
procedure. Some of the early decisions - Mapp and Gideon in particular 6 were in line with policies already in place in a substantial number of states. 7
From that we can infer, if not a consensus for those rules, at least substantial
political support and, perhaps, a general political trend in their direction. Yet
other decisions - Miranda most famously - were not in line with policies

already in place, and no such social-political infrastructure of support later
developed."
More importantly - and as a partial explanation - the Warren Court's
procedural reform effort came at a particularly inopportune moment. If we
define the Court's procedural reform period fromMapp through Earl Warren's
resignation - 1961 through 1968" - that coincides precisely with a dramatic
rise in crime rates for the first time in decades.4 ° Whatever their legacy on
ground-level operations in police stations and courthouses, the Warren Court
decisions in the context of rising crime and social unrest in the 1960s gave rise
to Richard Nixon's crime-control agenda, which Nixon framed explicitly in

oppositional response to Warren Court decisions.4"

36. See also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (concluding that Equal
Protection Clause requires appointment of counsel for criminal appeals); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (declaring that Equal Protection Clause bars states from charging fee to
indigent defendants for trial transcripts needed to appeal convictions); cf Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment incorporates Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and that Clause thus governs states).
37. See PowE, supra note 28, at 415 ("The vast majority of states already accorded the
accused the rights at issue .... ."); MELVIN I. UROFSKY, THE WARREN COURT: JUSTICES,
RULINGS, AND LEGACY 171 (2001) (noting that when the Court decided Gideon, forty-five states
provided counsel for indigent felony defendants).
38. See Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court andCriminalJustice,in THE WARREN COURT:
A RETROSPECTIVE 116, 119 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996) ("Miranda was the case that galvanized opposition to the Warren Court into a potent political force.").
39. We can also date the "real" Warren Court to 1962, when President Kennedy appointed
Arthur Goldberg to fill Justice Frankfurter's seat, providing the reliable "fifth vote" for the
liberal wing of the Court. See POWE, supra note 28, at 209-17 (noting that "real Warren Court"
was formed when Justice Frankfurter was forced to retire); Kermit L. Hall, The Warren Court
in Historical Perspective, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 293, 298 (Bernard
Schwartz ed., 1996) (remarking that shift in Warren Court after 1962 term is generally ascribed
to appointment of Justice Goldberg).
40. See CRAIGM. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINALPROCEDURE REVOLUIrON29
(1993) (reporting increased crime rates that coincided with Warren Court).
41. See POWE, supra note 28, at 408 (noting that crime was political issue and that
conservatives, including Richard Nixon, were calling for "law and order"); Hall, supra note 39,
at 298 ("After the 1962 term, the Warren Court emerged as the powerful institution of liberal
change against which Nixon and others rallied.").
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It is easy enough to characterize Warren Court decisions as hindering the
government's ability to fight crime at precisely the moment that we needed to
fight crime more effectively. Mapp extended the exclusionary rule to a much
broader set of illegal searches - those conducted by state police for state crime
cases42 - and the exclusionary rule undoubtedly can have the effect of making

prosecution of the guilty infeasible. While providing counsel to defendants as
Gideon mandated can increase the accuracy of verdicts and reduce wrongful
convictions,4 3 we also suspect defense counsel can sometimes obstruct successful prosecution ofthe guilty. And Mirandaclearly raised the fear that it would
reduce confessions," a key to conviction in many cases. Opponents of
Miranda for three decades argued (in my view, and I think in most others',
unpersuasively 5 ) that it reduced "clearance rates" for reported crimes.46
Nonetheless, in theory there is no reason that one must view the Warren
Court's criminal procedure decisions as hindering a societal response to rising
crime. Two frameworks firmly established in our intellectual history by the
1960s and 1970s made this view seem the inevitable one. The first explains

why criminal procedure rules seem to hinder crime control.47 The second helps

explain why, in reaction to that perceived loss of crime control ability, we not
only expanded the scope of substantive criminal law as Stuntz has argued, but
we also adopted a new, retributive premise for criminal punishment that we
implemented through dramatic increases in sentencing severity.4

42. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule to states
through Fourteenth Amendment).
43. , See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (recognizing that indigent
defendants cannot be assured fair trials without appointed counsel).
44. See generally Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of
Miranda's Defenders, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1084 (1996) (concluding that Mirandacauses loss of
3.8% of criminal cases each year); Paul 0. Cassell & Richard Fowles, FallingClearanceRates
After Miranda: Coincidence or Consequence?,50 STAN. L. REV. 1181 (1998) (suggesting that
fall in crime clearance rates can be attributed to Miranda);Paul 0. Cassell & Richard Fowles,
Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law
Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998) (concluding thatMiranda has "handcuffed" police
by reducing crime clearance rates).
45. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda and ClearanceRates, 91 Nw. U. L. REV.
278, 280 (1996) (stating that increased violent crime rates and lack of adequate police resources
"easily explain" decreasing clearance rates after Miranda); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Mranda's
PracticalEffect SubstantialBenefits and Vanishingly Small Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 500,
544-47 (1996) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Miranda's PracticalEffect] (summarizing data that
show virtually no adverse impact on law enforcement resulting from Miranda).
46. See supra note 44 (demonstrating concern that Miranda "handcuffs" police).
47. See infra Part IV.A (discussing Packer's dichotomy).
48. See infra Part IV.B (discussing switch from rehabilitation to retribution).
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IV CriminalProcedurein the Confines of IntellectualHistory
A. Packer'sDichotomy and the State'sMonopoly on Crime Control
By the end of the Warren Court's period of criminal procedure reform,
Herbert Packer developed a well-known thesis about basic choices in criminal
procedure regimes that was at once insightful and an articulation of widely
intuited assumptions. Packer's famous argument was that criminal procedure
regimes can be designed on two basic models, either a crime control model or
a due process model.49 The crime control model's primary objective is, obviously enough, effective crime detection and enforcement; it tries to minimize
procedural restraints that hinder those goals.5" The due process model, on the
other hand, adopts a foundational commitment to other values in addition to
truth-finding and enforcement, in particular it emphasizes fairness to defendants built on commitments to citizen autonomy and liberty.5
In Packer's view - and, I believe, in what became the widespread public
view - procedural regimes could adopt one model or the other, or a compromise between the two.52 But there is the critical assumption: One model
inevitably compromises the primary objective of the other. To protect due
process values, we trade off crime-fighting effectiveness. To effectively
control crime, we must sacrifice the autonomy and liberty values that enliven
due process commitments. We can compromise somewhere in the middle, but
it is basically a zero-sum game. No win-win solution in which we can choose
do little harm to the other exists.
one and
It was
within this framework that observers interpreted the Warren
Court's criminal procedure decisions. In this view, the Warren Court is the
paradigm of the due process model because it diminished the state's ability to
49. See Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the CriminalProcess, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
5-6 (1964) (introducing two models as means of discussing "operation of a process whose dayto-day functioning involves a constant series of minute adjustments between the competing
demands of two value systems").
50. See id. at 9-10 (stating that crime control model considers "the repression of criminal
conduct... the most important function" of criminal process and, further, that model requires
that "primary attention be paid" to system's ability to identify suspects, adjudicate guilt, and
impose sentences).
See id. at 14 (stating that paramount concerns of due process model are development
51.
of facts by formal, adjudicative, and adversary processes and defendant's "full opportunity to
discredit the case against him" before adjudication of his case); id. at 15 (stating that due
process model "insists on the prevention and elimination of mistakes to the extent possible").
at 5-6 (stating that two models reflect "separate value systems that compete for
52. See id.
attention" and that models assist in examining "resolutions ... between mutually exclusive
claims").
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fight crime. The problem was that it did so during a dramatic crime increase,
when crime control tools were suddenly much more important than before.
Under the Packer view - which we could think cf as Richard Nixon's view as
well, or probably the conventional wisdom view - the Warren Court perversely
restricted the government's ability to protect citizens at precisely the moment
that crime most threatened citizens. Packer's understanding rests on two
implicit premises: the state monopoly on crime control and the utilitarian
assumption that criminal law deters crime. Both remain vibrant - though
perhaps not quite as dominant - to this day.
1. The State Monopoly on Crime Control
First, this dichotomous framework makes sense only if we see the state as
the sole (or at least, clearly the most important) means for controlling crime.
Criminal procedure rules merely tell the state what it can and cannot do with
regard to investigation and adjudication: it cannot search without probable
cause; it cannot question arrestees without informing them of their right to
remain silent; and it cannot try suspects without providing them a lawyer.
Similarly, the crime control model assumes state actors are most effective at
reducing crime. 3 Police investigate crimes, gather evidence, and apprehend
suspects. Prosecutors charge and prosecute, courts convict and sentence, and
the government administers punishment. The premise that crime control
mostly means state action to control crime is widely accepted.
Interestingly this was not always so. The public sector did not always
monopolize crime control. That task was not always synonymous with law
enforcement, but rather once suggested "a more generalized, undifferentiated
conception of the agencies responsible for crime control and order maintenance."" Part of this notion that the state is not our only means (or the dominant and most effective means) of controlling crime lives on in discussions
about the "root causes" of crime and suggestions that education, housing and
jobs programs, or well-functioning families will do more to reduce crime than
imprisonment.5 5 But that notion became decreasingly persuasive (and increasingly parodied) starting in the 1970s. 6 Only recently have we seen in criminal
law scholarship a modestly revived interest in private forces rather than public
53.
See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER iN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 38-39 (2001) (discussing penal-welfarism).

54. Id. at 31; cf Dubber, supra note 17, at 853 (describing increased role in recent
decades for "the state's duty to guard the public welfare against social dangers").
55. See GARLAND, supra note 53, at 8, 170 (noting continued operation of rehabilitative
programs and discussing aspects of penal-welfarism still present in modern criminal control).
56. See id. at 53-55 (discussing generally collapse of penal-welfarism).
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ones, along5 with a faith that social influences may be more important to reduc-

ing crime.

2. UtilitarianVisions of Crime Control
The second premise underlying Packer's view - and the view that criminal
procedure rules have a causal link to rising crime - is the classic utilitarian
assumption regarding the deterrence effects of criminal law.5" As I discuss
below, 9 utilitarianism played a dominant role in conceptualizing criminal
punishment for most of the twentieth century, although it primarily supported
a rehabilitation vision rather than a narrow deterrence goal. Nonetheless, with
the implicit framework of utilitarianism readily available, it is easy to link
rising crime with procedural limitations on the state's ability to control crime.
In the classic deterrence calculus, deterrence effects are a function of two
variables: the likelihood of punishment and the severity of punishment.'o
Criminal procedure governs investigation and adjudication - elements in the
likelihood of punishment or the state's mechanisms of finding and punishing
criminals. If the Warren Court decisions reduce (or are perceived to reduce)
the likelihood of detection, arrest, evidence-gathering, and conviction, then
they affect the first variable and reduce criminal law's deterrence value.
Notwithstanding the persuasive critiques of that narrow deterrence model,
many perceived the Warren Court in those terms, and hence, perceived the
Warren Court as reducing the likelihood of punishment.6 After the Warren
Court, sentencing reform compensated by increasing the severity of punish62
ment.
57. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, SocialMeaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA.
L. REV. 349, 352-61 (1997) (discussing interaction between social influence and crime); Tracey
L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 669, 669-70 (1998) (stating that "the
structure of the community in which an individual lives interacts in important ways to either
facilitate or retard that individual's criminal or delinquent behavior").
58. See Packer, supra note 49, at 9 (stating that under crime control model, failure to
bring criminal conduct "under tight control" will "lead[ J to the breakdown of public order").
59. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text (discussing utilitarian and rehabilitation
view of criminal punishment).
60. See Gary Becker, Crime andPunishment: An EconomicApproach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 176-77 (1968) (discussing how to determine number of criminal offenses that will occur
in an economic model of crime).
61.
See supranote 44 (demonstrating concern that Miranda "handcuffs" police).
62.
See THESENTENCINOPROJECT, BRIEFINGSHEETNO. 068,THE EXPANDINGFEDERAL
PRISON POPULATION (rev. 2002) (showing federal prison population growth from 1981 to 2001);
THE SENTENCINGPROJECT,BRMFING SHEETNO. 1044,NEWPRISONPOPUIATIONFIOURES SHOW
SLOWING OF GROWTH BUT UNCERTAIN TRENDS 1 (2002) (stating that there was 79% increase

in state and federal prison population from 1990 to 2000).
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So, one aspect of the Warren Court's legacy - the resistance met by its
criminal procedure decisions - is a function of the moment in social history in
which it occurred and the ideological framework through which we understood
those decisions. In an era of rising crime, Warren Court decisions look like illconceived restraints on the only effective means with which we have to respond to crime. A sustained, systemic reaction againstthe Court, in retrospect,
looks inevitable. That response could have taken quite different forms. Unlike
the issue of racial segregation, however, there was little independent social and
political momentum to buttress a commitment to a due process model of
criminal procedure, nor was there much conceptual basis for pursuing tools of
crime control separate from state-run policing and prosecution.
Instead, that response took the form of emphasizing the remaining components of the state's criminal justice system that criminal procedure rules did not
regulate. Those components are, first, the substantive scope of criminal law
and, second, the form and degree of punishment. Bill Stuntz, and, to a lesser
degree others, developed the story of the first response.63 Hence, I will merely
reference that account here. The second response I will develop a bit more, for
I think it is another instance of unintended consequences from Warren Court
criminal procedure decisions and, to some degree, that Court's other civil
liberties decisions. In short, my thesis in the next subpart is that the Warren
Court not only created the impetus for a crime-control reaction, but also
provided part ofthe conceptual foundation for much of its particular form. The
Warren Court's emphasis on respect for individual autonomy and due process,
in a range of government-citizen interactions, helped feed the critique of
rehabilitation-oriented penal sanctions and inspired the turn to retribution and
the organizing theme of punishment in the 1970s. And that premise produced
(not inevitably, but as it happened) the draconian system of incarceration that
we built for the last three decades and are only now beginning to reassess.
B. The Switch from Utilitarianismand Rehabilitation
to Punitive Retributivism
People of my generation and younger have no first-hand memory of this
fact, but for most of the twentieth century - through the 1960s - society
understood criminal punishment in utilitarian terms and criminal punishment
aimed to serve the function not only (or even primarily) of deterrence, but also
of rehabilitation."4 As late as 1972, the Model Sentencing Act declared,
63. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text (discussing Stuntz's work addressing
importance of constitutional regulation of substantive criminal law).
64. See GARLAND, supra note 53, at 34-35 (tracing evolution of penal-welfarist and
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"Persons convicted of crime shall be dealt with in accordance with their
potential for rehabilitation, considering their individual characteristics, circumstances and needs." 65 Out of this understanding came the long tradition of
indeterminate sentencing. Legislatures drafted statutes allowing sentences, for
example, of "one to twenty years," and judges would sometimes sentence
individual offenders almost as broadly.s
Even if the sentencing judge defined a more specific sentence - ten years,
for example - everyone involved understood that the offender may well not
serve that much time. Parole boards, with the aid of prison officials, were to
determine when an offender was rehabilitated or was otherwise ready for
release. The goal was an individually tailored assessment of offenders that led
to individualized, specifically appropriate sentences. 67 One armed robber
might be ready for release after a year in prison; another might need ten years
or more for rehabilitation. When the criterion for punishment is an individual's rehabilitative status, it makes no sense to think about standard, determinate sentences, unless one believes that every person is rehabilitated in the
same time under the same conditions.'
By the late 1960s, this system, and the ideological premises upon which
it was built, faced increasing criticism. Interestingly, that criticism arose from
both the Right and the Left of the political spectrum, and Warren Court
jurisprudence helped shape the Left's response. As has been extensively
discussed elsewhere, the criminal procedure cases contributed to a broader
Warren Court theme of strengthening individual rights against state action,
with a particular concern for personal privacy, autonomy, and equitable
treatment. I will simply note this commonplace understanding with a few
examples. Griswold v. Connecticut69 joins criminal procedure cases such as
Mapp in defining greater personal privacy rights against state intrusion.70 Free
correctionalist crime control); ANDREW VoN HIRSCH, DOING JUsnCE 4, 9-12 (1976) ("Twenty
years ago the aim seemed clear: to rehabilitate the offender.").
65. MoDEL SENTENCING ACT § 1(2d ed. 1972).
66.

See MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 5-6 (1973) (remarking that broadly

written statutes leave sentencing to "unfettered discretion" ofjudges).
67.

See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, Tim DECLINE OF TE REHABuHIATIVE IDEAL 2-6 (1981)

(describing rehabilitative ideal concept ofcriminal punishment).
68.
This is not to say that the actual practice of criminal sentencing always served, or was
actually motivated by, rehabilitative ideals. In addition to the obvious exception to this
premise - widespread use of the death penalty in the first half of the twentieth century - the
history of punitive incarceration, hard labor, and chain gangs, especially for African American
convicts, suggests the formal conceptual foundation for punishment was not always fulfilled in
practice.
69. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
70. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (relying in part on Mapp
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speech decisions expressed increasing concern for personal expressions
(artistic as well as political) that are essential to a robust conception of personal autonomy.7 And more robust conceptions of fair and equitable treatment informed due process decisions, including the post-Warren Goldberg v.
Kelly1 2 decision, and the nascent prison reform and prisoners' rights litigation
of the 1960s." 3 Equitable treatment was an underlying concern of a range of
criminal procedure decisions that aimed to reduce the disadvantages of
poverty in litigation.74 It also underlays substantive criminal law decisions,
such as Papachristouv. City of Jacksonville,75 which sought to limit police
discretion by overturning an ordinance that provided a means for racial (or
otherwise illegitimate) discrimination."' This overarching theme of individual
rights both reflected and contributed to a broader social ethos of the 1960s
that included a heightened emphasis on personal autonomy from imperious or
inequitable state intrusion.
In the realm of criminal punishment, this theme of individual rights was
important to the liberal critiques of the dominant regime of rehabilitative,
discretionary sentencing.77 The American Friends Service Committee's 1971
to conclude that Constitution gives rise to "zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees"); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961) (referring to
constitutional guarantee against "unreasonable" searches as "an essential part of the right to
privacy").
71.
See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Dissent,Free Speech, and the ContinuingSearchfor
the "CentralMeaning" of the FirstAmendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1613, 1614-15 (2000)
(reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A MEDITATION ON LAW,
REUGiON, ANDLOYALTY(1 998); STEvENH. Sum DIssEI,,usiicE, ANTBiMAiNGS
OF AMERICA (1999)) (noting various rationales for protecting free speech in light of Warren
Court's expansive protections); Martin Redish, The Value ofFree Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
591, 593-94 (1982) (offering thesis that "individual self-realization" is "one true value" served
by free speech).
72. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970) (requiring hearing prior to termination of welfare benefits).
73.
See JOHN A. FUrER, PRISONERS' RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND EVOLVING
STANDARDS OF DECENCY 64, 69 (2001) (commenting on connection between civil rights
movement and prisoners' rights and commenting on Warren Court's extension of due process
and equal protection guarantees to prisoners).
74. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134-37 (1967) (finding right to counsel applicable
to probation revocation proceedings); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("[l]n
our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire
a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.").
75.
405 U.S. 156 (1972).
76. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972) (overturning
vagrancy statute because it prevented even-handed administration ofjustice).
77. See GARLAND, supra note 53, at 53-73 (discussing sources and successes of criticisms
of rehabilitative "penal welfarism" in 1970s).
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report Strugglefor Justice criticized the premise of individualized treatment

that provided the foundation for discretionary sentencing and parole.7 It
argued that the practice of criminal punishment was inequitable, paternalistic,
and discriminatory. George Jackson's 1970 prison memoir, SoledadBrother,
offered a searing account of the alienation and rage engendered in many
inmates - as well as the emptiness of rehabilitative ideals - by the realities of
indeterminate incarceration.79 By the mid-1970s, mainstream liberal scholars
in criminal law and criminology were advocating - for the first time in generations - a theory of punishment grounded in retributivism rather than utilitarianism." The interesting element here is how many of these initial advocates
of "just deserts" theory saw it as a means to reduce excessive and inequitable

sentencing rather than as a rationale to justify more consistently harsh incarceration, as it was used a few years later."'
At the same time, the political Right continued its own attack on
rehabilitation-oriented, indeterminate punishment. Richard Nixon's war-oncrime rhetoric set the strategic themes for Republican Party campaigns for the
next two decades. 2 Concurrently, prominent academics, such as James Q.
Wilson in his popular 1975 book, Thinking About Crime, argued for a harsh
regime of determinate sentencing that abandoned goals of individualized
treatment and rehabilitation in favor of the presumed deterrent effect of tough,
certain punishments. 3 This law-and-order response, rather than building on
78. See ALLEN, supra note 67, at 7 (stating that report signaled future decline of "penal
rehabilitationism"); GARLAND, supra note 53, at 55-58 (discussing report's impact).
79. See generallyGEORGE JACKSON, SOLEDAD BRoTHER (1970) (describing life as young
black male in Soledad Prison).
80. See GARLAND, supranote 53, at 59 (noting that DOING JUSTICE, VON HIRSCH, supra
note 64, argued for retributive punishment as end in itself for first time in decades); RICHARD
G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS, at xv (1979) (noting that DOING JUSTICE, VON HIRSCH, supra note
64, recognized that punishment is only legitimate goal of sentencing process).
81.
See generally SINGER, supra note 80 (exploring commensurate deserts approach to
sentencing); VON HIRSCH, supra note 64 (endorsing retributionist philosophy of punishment);
Norval Morris, Desert as a Limiting Principle,reprintedin PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 180 (Andrew von Hirsch &Andrew Ashworth eds., 2d ed. 1998)
(favoring sentences that are primarily retributive and relate to crime committed, and viewing just
deserts theory as limiting, rather than defining, principle).
82. See BRADLEY, supra note 40, at 30 (noting that Richard Nixon made Supreme Court
centerpiece of his campaign and charging that Court had "'weaken[ed] the peace forces as
against the criminal forces"'); POWE, supra note 28, at 399 (calling crime "a Republican issue"
and noting Richard Nixon's use of crime as centerpiece of domestic side of his stump speech
for congressional candidates); ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 2 n.1 (noting that "Presidents
Nixon and Reagan pledged to end judicial activism").
83. See JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKINGABOUT CRME 172 (1975) (proposing that function
of criminal justice system should be to isolate and punish); see also GARLAND, supra note 53,
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Warren Court premises to criticize the prevailing punishment regime as the
Left did, continued the critique of the Court's criminal justice decisions.
This result, then, is the perverse effect of the Warren Court on criminal
law and punishment policy for the last three decades. The Court's criminal
procedure legacy helped provide both the tools and the foil for critiques of the
dominant commitment to rehabilitative punishment. Yet that regime - in
theory, though often not in practice - was in much closer accord with the
Warren Court's commitments to humane, equitable uses of state power that
infringe individual liberty and dignity than the more punitive regime that
succeeded it.
V Conclusion - Lessons for Courts and Others
The lessons we might draw from this understanding of events are more
difficult to discern. Would one who likes the Warren Court's decisions and
who also favors a less punitive punishment regime advise, with the benefit of
hindsight, that the Court not have embarked on this course at all? More generally, does this view suggest that judicial reform is frequently ineffective or
even counter-productive, and that social reform comes only through more
traditional political action?
On the former question, I do not think one can say that the Warren Court's
criminal procedure decisions were, on the whole, ill-advised and counterproductive. It is difficult to measure the success of these decisions, but there
are plausible arguments that they gave us lasting, if marginal, improvements
in the criminal justice system. Mapp's exclusionary rule is far from an effective (or even consistently enforced) deterrent on illegal searches, but the
ensuing four decades have not yielded strong arguments for a better alternative.
After Gideon, felony defendants have at least token counsel, but it is hard to
say whether Gideon itself has been ineffective or whether subsequent decisions
by the Court, such as Strickland v. Washington's 4 ineffective-assistance
standards, 5 account for the poor quality of much felony representation.
Miranda proved its initial critics wrong and turned out to be a quite feasible
practice for police to administer, in part because law enforcement developed
interrogation techniques to get statements despite the warning.86 Thus, whether
Mirandaprovides an effective advisory is harder to assess. One cannot conclude with confidence that Warren Court decisions resulted in substantial
at 59 (stating that James Q. Wilson favored deterrence and control through sentencing).
84. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
85. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (establishing two-part test
to determine whether appointed counsel was ineffective).
86. See Schulhofer, Miranda's PracticalEffect, supra note 45, at 507-10 (discussing law
enforcement's adaptation to Miranda).
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progress, or even that they are responsible for progress that other more political
means of social reform would not have made. In any of these cases, though, it
is hard to say the particular practice at issue (illegal searches, felony trial
defense, coerced confessions) is in a worse state now than four decades ago.
However, on the latter, broader question of whether social reform is more
effective when it comes from courts or through political action, the Warren
Court's criminal procedure legacy offers support for the theme we draw from
scholars such as Stuntz, Klarman, Tushnet, and Rosenberg. 7 Courts are
relatively poor mechanisms through which to effect substantial reform, especially without concomitant support in social and political movements."'
Without such support, bold judicial decisions are as likely as not to be ineffective or even counter-productive. Such effects are hard to predict at the time of
decision.
But this lesson is not so much for courts as for reformers. Courts should
pay little attention to the unintended, long-term (and thus, often unforeseeable)
consequences that their decisions may have. Courts are not likely to be good
at assessing those effects ex ante. Because these effects are contingent on the
reactions of other political actors and developments, they are hardly predictable. As Garland has argued, the reaction to the failures of rehabilitative
punishment could have taken many forms; it did not require wholesale abandonment of rehabilitation and replacement with a harsh retributivism and
deterrence model.8 9 That reaction was something over which the Court had
little influence or responsibility. On the other hand, it does suggest that the
Court should be sensitive to ex post assessments of its efforts at dramatic
change, which it can achieve in at least three ways. First, the Court can be
more willing to revisit established rules. Second, it can innovate other doctrines as developments reveal the inadequacy or unintended effects of earlier
decisions. Examples of this approach include Stuntz's argument for more
rigorous regulation of substantive criminal law and the creation of a stronger
Strickland standard to buttress Gideon.' Finally, it can construct doctrines in
ways that allow political actors more leeway to make final policy decisions.
87.
See supra notes 18-32 and accompanying text (discussing inability of courts to
achieve widespread social reform).
88.
See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text (discussing popular support and the
ability of courts to effect social change).
89.
See GARLAND, supra note 53, at 65 (stating that defenders of status quo could have
avoided criticism by pointing to demographic factors, need for greater reforms, and lack of
better alternatives).
90.
See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text (discussing Stuntz's argument that
Gideon requires regulation of rates paid to counsel in order to meaningfully guarantee effective
assistance of counsel); supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (arguing that expansion of
criminal liability has undercut goals of Warren Court and relying in part on Stuntz's work).
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However, punishment reform in light of criminal procedure decisions may
be more of a lesson for reformers. We already have grounds to reassess both
the commitment of limited resources to litigation-based reform strategies rather
than more popular political ones and also to assess the risk that litigation not
only takes resources, but also undermines commitment to politically oriented
reform. We already know that formal victories by judicial decision can have
modest effects on broad social change (though they are not always modest).
The Warren Court's contribution to the political debates that resulted in our
sentencing policies of the last two decades is merely a reminder of the law of
unintended consequences and of the practical truth that reform through litigation is no easier to manage, predict, or achieve than reform by any other means.

